Subcalculus for set functions and cores of TU games.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00080-0zbMath1061.91002OpenAlexW1992619071MaRDI QIDQ1394991

Massimo Marinacci, Luigi Montrucchio

Publication date: 25 June 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00080-0

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gametransferable utilityLyapunov theoremmeasure game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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A characterization of the core of convex games through Gâteaux derivatives, Cores of non-atomic market games, Laws of large numbers of negatively correlated random variables for capacities, A new class of convex games on \(\sigma\)-algebras and the optimal partitioning of measurable spaces, Classical subjective expected utility, The bargaining set of a large game

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