Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00083-6zbMath1042.91063OpenAlexW1968334057MaRDI QIDQ1394996

Nicholas C. Yannelis, Akram Temimi, Stefan Krasa

Publication date: 25 June 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(02)00083-6

zbMATH Keywords

BargainingDifferential information economiesCoalition structure valueUnder differential information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (5)

A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure ⋮ An alternative proof for the existence of Radner equilibria ⋮ An entropy-based information sharing rule for asymmetric information economies ⋮ Bargaining and membership ⋮ Coalition formation in games without side payments

Cites Work

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• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Existence and properties of a value allocation for an economy with differential information
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information
• Differential information economies: Introduction
• An extensive form interpretation of the private core

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