Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1395584
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00563-8zbMath1035.91057OpenAlexW2001185188MaRDI QIDQ1395584
Publication date: 1 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00563-8
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