Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
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Publication:1395591
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00533-XzbMath1035.91020MaRDI QIDQ1395591
Publication date: 1 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (8)
How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence ⋮ Strategic argumentation ⋮ A characterization of equilibrium set of persuasion games with binary actions ⋮ Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence ⋮ Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games ⋮ Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences ⋮ Evidence reading mechanisms ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
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