Exploring the cooperative regimes in an agent-based model: indirect reciprocity vs. selfish incentives

DOI10.1016/S0378-4371(03)00263-2zbMath1049.91011OpenAlexW1841257672WikidataQ62476796 ScholiaQ62476796MaRDI QIDQ1396859

Hugo Fort

Publication date: 13 July 2003

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-4371(03)00263-2

zbMATH Keywords

self-organizationmean-field modelcooperation probability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

A co-evolutionary model combined mixed-strategy and network adaptation by severing disassortative neighbors promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games ⋮ A Matrix Approach to Generalizing Axelrod-Type Tournaments ⋮ The existence of fence-sitters relaxes the spatial prisoner's dilemma and enhances network reciprocity ⋮ GLAD: a simple adaptive strategy that yields cooperation in dilemma games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Stochastic strategies in the prisoner's dilemma
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Non-cooperative games

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