On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00025-8zbMath1045.91002OpenAlexW2017005962MaRDI QIDQ1398328

Anke Gerber, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 29 July 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00025-8

zbMATH Keywords

coredurabilitycoalition structurehedonic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY ⋮ A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games ⋮ The core-partition of a hedonic game ⋮ Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem ⋮ A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games ⋮ Bargaining cum voice ⋮ Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem ⋮ Coalitions, agreements and efficiency ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Strategy-proof coalition formation ⋮ Dynamic coalitional equilibrium ⋮ Unique stability in simple coalition formation games ⋮ Salvador Barberà ⋮ The strategy structure of some coalition formation games ⋮ Coalition formation among farsighted agents ⋮ The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

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