Instrument choice for environmental protection when technological innovation is endogenous.

DOI10.1016/S0095-0696(03)00002-0zbMath1040.91509OpenAlexW2107596579WikidataQ58386410 ScholiaQ58386410MaRDI QIDQ1398338

Ian W. H. Parry, Carolyn Fischer, William A. Pizer

Publication date: 29 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0095-0696(03)00002-0

zbMATH Keywords

impactsExternalitiesTechnological innovationWelfareEnvironmental policies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Carbon markets and technological innovation ⋮ Environmental and technology policies for climate mitigation ⋮ The timing of taxes on CO\(_2\) emissions when technological change is endogenous ⋮ Environmental subsidy and the choice of green technology in the presence of green consumers ⋮ Environmental regulation, technological diversity, and the dynamics of technological change ⋮ Cap-and-trade, taxes, and distributional conflict ⋮ Taxes versus quantities for a stock pollutant with endogenous abatement costs and asymmetric information ⋮ Incentives for environmental research and development: consumer preferences, competitive pressure and emissions taxation ⋮ Endogenous abatement technology agreements under environmental regulation ⋮ ``It's all in the mix! -- Internalizing externalities with R\&D subsidies and environmental liability

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