Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00085-9zbMath1057.91005MaRDI QIDQ1398383

Toru Hokari, Özgür Kıbrıs

Publication date: 29 July 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

kernelnucleolusconverse MW-consistencyMW-consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games ⋮ Feasibility-free axiomatization of the core and its non-empty extension ⋮ Axiomatizing core extensions ⋮ On the importance of reduced games in axiomatizing core extensions

Cites Work

• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• Order independent equilibria
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
• Axiomatization of the Nucleolus
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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