Rationalizable outcomes of large private-value first-price discrete auctions.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00016-2zbMath1040.91042MaRDI QIDQ1399511

Asher Wolinsky, Eddie Dekel

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitylarge auctionsCommon knowledge of rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION ⋮ Internet auctions with many traders ⋮ Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions. ⋮ Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ Value-rationalizability in auction bidding ⋮ Mechanism Design ⋮ Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS ⋮ Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance ⋮ Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners

Cites Work

• Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
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