Consistent solutions for cooperative games with externalities.
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Publication:1399513
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00011-3zbMath1040.91011OpenAlexW2066139966MaRDI QIDQ1399513
Tomas Sjöström, Chen-Ying Huang
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00011-3
Related Items (17)
Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games ⋮ Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products ⋮ The Core of Aggregative Cooperative Games with Externalities ⋮ The Nash bargaining solution in general \(n\)-person cooperative games ⋮ On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games ⋮ Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities ⋮ Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core ⋮ The recursive nucleolus for partition function form games ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational firms ⋮ Solving coalitional resource games ⋮ Stable sharing rules and participation in pools of essential patents ⋮ Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games ⋮ Equivalence nucleolus for coalitional games with externalities ⋮ A recursive core for partition function form games ⋮ Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities ⋮ The recursive core for non-superadditive games
Cites Work
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- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- Credible coalitions and the core
- A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
- A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
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