The effectiveness of English auctions.
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Publication:1399514
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00005-8zbMath1048.91051OpenAlexW2066957841MaRDI QIDQ1399514
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00005-8
Related Items (22)
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values ⋮ Correlation-robust auction design ⋮ Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes ⋮ On Condorelli inequality for log-concave demand ⋮ Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions ⋮ Surplus sharing in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions ⋮ Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents ⋮ I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions ⋮ Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals ⋮ Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly ⋮ Making the Most of Your Samples ⋮ Prediction and welfare in ad auctions ⋮ Robust screening under ambiguity ⋮ Coarse matching with incomplete information ⋮ Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading ⋮ Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition ⋮ A lower-bound on monopoly profit for log-concave demand ⋮ (No) foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007) ⋮ Revenue maximization with a single sample
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