Unraveling in first-price auction.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00003-4zbMath1040.91041MaRDI QIDQ1399519

Parimal Kanti Bag

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

information revelationdue skepticismFirst-price auctionincentive to disclose at the toprandom bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• A simple model of expert and non-expert bidding in first-price auctions
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Unnamed Item

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