Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00550-XzbMath1052.91063MaRDI QIDQ1399522

Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto-optimal allocationssymmetric allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54) Multiobjective variational problems, Pareto optimality, applications to economics, etc. (58E17)

Related Items (6)

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities ⋮ von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of income tax rates in public good economies ⋮ Perfect and proper equilibria in large games

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• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Quasi-Equilibria in Markets with Non-Convex Preferences
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

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