Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00553-5zbMath1048.91007OpenAlexW3122020655WikidataQ57486282 ScholiaQ57486282MaRDI QIDQ1399530

Stephanie Rosenkranz, Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00553-5

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractsproperty rightspartnerships

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Dynamic games (91A25)

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Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information ⋮ Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership ⋮ Sequential Investments, Know-How Transmission, and Optimal Organization

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