Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
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Publication:1399541
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00004-8zbMath1052.91017OpenAlexW2071420733MaRDI QIDQ1399541
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00004-8
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