Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
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Publication:1399544
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00003-6zbMath1056.91005OpenAlexW2096904520MaRDI QIDQ1399544
Alexander Kovalenkov, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00003-6
Related Items (15)
On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ Existence of share equilibrium in symmetric local public good economies ⋮ Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies ⋮ Dynamic club formation with coordination ⋮ Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores ⋮ Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players ⋮ Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment ⋮ Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities ⋮ Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization ⋮ Convergence of the approximate cores to the aspiration core in partitioning games
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