Information in conflicts.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00006-1zbMath1048.91054MaRDI QIDQ1399545

Karl Wärneryd

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcontestmarket transactions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (29)

On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests ⋮ Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case ⋮ Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests ⋮ A note on Bayesian Nash equilibria in imperfectly discriminating contests ⋮ Who gains from information asymmetry? ⋮ Information acquisition in conflicts ⋮ Information sharing in a contest game with group identity ⋮ The evolution of preferences for conflict ⋮ Private versus complete information in auctions ⋮ Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations ⋮ Information in Tullock contests ⋮ Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information ⋮ On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result ⋮ Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Common-value contests with asymmetric information ⋮ Probabilistic procurement auctions ⋮ Accuracy in contests: players' perspective ⋮ Non-deterministic group contest with private information ⋮ Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists ⋮ An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information ⋮ Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information ⋮ The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests ⋮ Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Multi-player contests with asymmetric information ⋮ A tug-of-war team contest ⋮ Information sharing in private value lottery contest ⋮ A note on rent dissipation in lottery contests ⋮ Rent-seeking group contests with one-sided private information ⋮ Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

Cites Work

• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Contest success functions

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