Evidence on the equivalence of the strategic and extensive form representation of games.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00040-1zbMath1042.91006OpenAlexW4249365654MaRDI QIDQ1399555

David J. Cooper, John B. Van Huyck

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00040-1

zbMATH Keywords

experimentGame theorystrategic equivalence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Games in extensive form (91A18) Experimental studies (91A90)

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