On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00033-4zbMath1057.91025OpenAlexW2089936379MaRDI QIDQ1399561

Sérgio O. Parreiras, Hanming Fang

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00033-4

zbMATH Keywords

auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints ⋮ Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents ⋮ Budget constraints in homogenous multi-unit auctions ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in auctions ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Efficient ex post implementable auctions and English auctions for bidders with non-quasilinear preferences ⋮ On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints ⋮ The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information ⋮ The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions

Cites Work

• Equilibrium of affiliated value second price auctions with financially constrained bidders: The two-bidder case
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders.