Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00036-XzbMath1042.91011MaRDI QIDQ1399562

Frédéric Koessler

Publication date: 30 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

provabilityStrategic information revelationhigher-order uncertaintyPersuasion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items

Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty. ⋮ How to consult an expert? Opinion versus evidence ⋮ Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion ⋮ Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games ⋮ Verifiable disclosure ⋮ Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences ⋮ Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types

Cites Work

• The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
• Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
• ``Knowing whether, ``knowing that, and the cardinality of state spaces
• Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty
• Sequential Equilibria