Semivalues as power indices.
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Publication:1399609
DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00453-8zbMath1045.91003OpenAlexW1999332050MaRDI QIDQ1399609
Francesc Carreras, María Jesús de la Puente, Josep Freixas
Publication date: 30 July 2003
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0377-2217(02)00453-8
Related Items (17)
Semivalues: weighting coefficients and allocations on unanimity games ⋮ An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games ⋮ Decisiveness indices are semiindices ⋮ Decisiveness indices are semiindices: addendum ⋮ Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters ⋮ On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues ⋮ Egalitarian property for power indices ⋮ Enumeration of weighted games with minimum and an analysis of voting power for bipartite complete games with minimum ⋮ Generating semivalues via unanimity games ⋮ Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games ⋮ On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games ⋮ Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions ⋮ Partnership formation and binomial semivalues ⋮ COMPARING POWER INDICES ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues ⋮ Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
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