Dynamic common agency.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00079-6zbMath1052.91028OpenAlexW3122286720MaRDI QIDQ1400983

Juuso Välimäki, Dirk Bergemann

Publication date: 17 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00079-6

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriumMarkov perfectDynamic biddingMarginal contribution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (8)

Strategic consensus ⋮ On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting ⋮ A note on low-price menu auctions ⋮ Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities ⋮ Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization ⋮ Dynamic price competition ⋮ Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria ⋮ Sequential contracting with multiple principals

Cites Work

• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Common Agency
• Complements and substitutes in common agency
• Learning and Strategic Pricing
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions

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