Clever agents in adaptive learning.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00068-1zbMath1097.91019MaRDI QIDQ1400987

Alexander Matros

Publication date: 17 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Markov chainGame theoryBounded rationalityStochastic stabilityEvolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

Deep and shallow thinking in the long run ⋮ Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game ⋮ Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play ⋮ Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• Learning by forgetful players
• The Evolution of Conventions

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