Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00017-XzbMath1042.91073OpenAlexW2058574627MaRDI QIDQ1401111

Gaël Giraud, Hubert Stahn

Publication date: 17 August 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(03)00017-x

zbMATH Keywords

InflationIncomplete marketsMonitoringMechanism designConstrained efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (5)

Nash competitive equilibria and two-period fund separation ⋮ Debt-deflation versus the liquidity trap: the dilemma of nonconventional monetary policy ⋮ Strategic market games: an introduction. ⋮ Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism ⋮ On Shapley-Shubik equilibria with financial markets

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