Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(02)00086-0zbMath1053.91009MaRDI QIDQ1402487

J. J. López, J. R. Fernández García, Encarnación Algaba, Jésus Mario Bilbao

Publication date: 28 August 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

generating functionBanzhaf power indexShapley-Shubik power index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites Work

• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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