Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games

DOI10.1023/A:1024158301610zbMath1112.91018OpenAlexW1526848034MaRDI QIDQ1403963

Joël Moulen, Lawrence Diffo Lambo

Publication date: 20 August 2003

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1024158301610

zbMATH Keywords

power indicesvoting gamesswap robustdesirability relationsveto-holder extension

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Voting theory (91B12)

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