On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential information economies

DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0299-2zbMath1040.91067OpenAlexW4246850704MaRDI QIDQ1404136

Allan Muir, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Dionysius Glycopantis

Publication date: 20 August 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0299-2

zbMATH Keywords

Radner equilibriumContractsPerfect Bayesian equilibriumPrivate coreCoalitional Bayesian incentive compatibilityDifferential information economyFree disposalGame treesRational expectations equilibriumSequential equilibriumWeak fine coreWeak fine value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Games in extensive form (91A18) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (27)

Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies ⋮ Incentive compatibility under ambiguity ⋮ An alternative proof for the existence of Radner equilibria ⋮ Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies ⋮ The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies ⋮ Randomization under ambiguity: efficiency and incentive compatibility ⋮ Equilibrium price formation in markets with differentially informed agents ⋮ A tree formulation for signaling games ⋮ Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and with infinitely many commodities ⋮ Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies ⋮ Ambiguous implementation: the partition model ⋮ Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ On the equivalence of rational expectations equilibrium with perfect Bayesian equilibrium ⋮ General equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery ⋮ Continuity properties of the private core ⋮ On mixed markets with asymmetric information ⋮ A market game approach to differential information economies ⋮ The measure of blocking coalitions in differential information economies ⋮ On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium ⋮ Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states ⋮ Large economies with differential information and without free disposal ⋮ Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery ⋮ Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information ⋮ An equivalence theorem for a differential information economy ⋮ Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries

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