Information at equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00199-002-0260-4zbMath1040.91004OpenAlexW3121445539MaRDI QIDQ1404141

Enrico Minelli, Herakles M. Polemarchakis

Publication date: 20 August 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/80112

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumRational expectationsCommon knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (3)

Observing each other's observations in a Bayesian coordination game ⋮ Stable outcomes and information in games: an empirical framework ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games

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