Equilibria in large games with continuous procedures.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00168-6zbMath1043.91004OpenAlexW2081449995MaRDI QIDQ1406461

Aldo Rustichini

Publication date: 4 September 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00168-6

zbMATH Keywords

Procedural rationalitySophisticated agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics

Cites Work

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