From private to public common agency.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00077-2zbMath1043.91002MaRDI QIDQ1406472

Bruno Versaevel, Etienne Billette De Villemeur

Publication date: 4 September 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

ExternalitiesCommon agencyPrivatePublic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria

Cites Work

• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Complements and substitutes in common agency
• Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

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