On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions

DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0267-xzbMath1046.91039OpenAlexW2144373189MaRDI QIDQ1407778

Hideki Mizukami

Publication date: 21 September 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10110/1671

zbMATH Keywords

Social choiceStrategy-proofnessTransferable utilityBribe-proofnessConstancy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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