Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
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Publication:1408641
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00021-6zbMath1066.91033MaRDI QIDQ1408641
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (15)
Auctions with financial externalities ⋮ A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers ⋮ When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships ⋮ Partnership Dissolution: Information and Efficiency ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. ⋮ Partnership dissolution and proprietary information ⋮ Dissolving (in)effective partnerships ⋮ Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions ⋮ Contests with rank-order spillovers ⋮ The effect of collusion on efficiency in experimental auctions ⋮ Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
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