Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00014-9zbMath1057.91051OpenAlexW2145192447MaRDI QIDQ1408643

Francesco Squintani

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00014-9

zbMATH Keywords

Evolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Non-Archimedean game theory: a numerical approach

Cites Work

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• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
• Reputation and imperfect information
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• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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