Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00019-8zbMath1044.91003MaRDI QIDQ1408648

María Paz Espinosa, Inés Macho-Stadler

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardpartnershipssequential gameendogenous coalition formationlinear Cournot model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers

Cites Work

• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Stable coalition structures with open membership and asymmetric firms
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition
• VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM

This page was built for publication: Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard