Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00029-0zbMath1061.91005OpenAlexW3125961711MaRDI QIDQ1408706

Dilip Abreu, Rajiv Sethi

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00029-0

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilitybargainingreputational model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (8)

Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations ⋮ Equilibrium vengeance ⋮ Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance? ⋮ Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli ⋮ Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences ⋮ Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict ⋮ The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types ⋮ Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and imperfect information
• On the evolution of optimizing behavior
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• Evolutionarily stable sets
• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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