The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
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Publication:1408707
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00027-7zbMath1056.91015OpenAlexW2079912971MaRDI QIDQ1408707
Heidrun C. Hoppe, Michael R. Baye
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00027-7
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