Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00022-8zbMath1056.91007MaRDI QIDQ1408709

Michael Kahneman, Elchanan Ben-Porath

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Repeated gamesCommunicationCostly monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (12)

The value of recommendations ⋮ Who will watch the watchers? On optimal monitoring networks ⋮ Limited records and reputation bubbles ⋮ Finitely repeated games with monitoring options ⋮ Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags ⋮ Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring ⋮ Community enforcement with observation costs ⋮ The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs ⋮ Repeated games with voluntary information purchase ⋮ Voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma with reference letters ⋮ Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ An efficiency result in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game under costly observation with nonpublic randomization

Cites Work

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• Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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