The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00028-9zbMath1064.91038OpenAlexW2078109254MaRDI QIDQ1408711

Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz, Ezra Einy

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00028-9

zbMATH Keywords

game theorymarket modelsCournot duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium ⋮ When is the value of public information positive in a game? ⋮ Public information in Markov games ⋮ The role of information in contests ⋮ The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests ⋮ Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

Cites Work

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• Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
• Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
• Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets
• The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly

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