Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts.
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Publication:1408712
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00024-1zbMath1056.91008MaRDI QIDQ1408712
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (6)
Analogy-based expectation equilibrium ⋮ Bottom-up design of strategic options as finite automata ⋮ Rational belief hierarchies ⋮ Adaptation and complexity in repeated games ⋮ Learning across games ⋮ Categorizing others in a large game
Cites Work
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- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Finite automata equilibria with discounting
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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