Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00049-6zbMath1056.91012OpenAlexW2123537229MaRDI QIDQ1408714

Larry Samuelson, Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00049-6

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumComplexityEvolutionary stabilityLexicographic preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (4)

Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata ⋮ DYADIC THEORETICAL GAMES MODELS OF DECISION-MAKING FOR THE LEXICOGRAPHIC VECTOR PAYOFFS ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.

Cites Work

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• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• In defense of DEFECT.
• Supergames played by finite automata with finite costs of complexity in an evolutionary setting
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata

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