The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium.
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Publication:1408716
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00055-1zbMath1056.91006MaRDI QIDQ1408716
Tomoichi Shinotsuka, Koji Takamiya
Publication date: 25 September 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (4)
Constrained school choice ⋮ Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Nash implementation without no-veto power ⋮ Maskin's theorem with limited veto power
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