Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice

DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0279-6zbMath1068.91016OpenAlexW2072852712MaRDI QIDQ1408943

John A. Weymark, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 28 September 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15641

zbMATH Keywords

Political economyVotingCandidate stabilityAxiomatic social choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures ⋮ An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit ⋮ Candidate stability and voting correspondences ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem ⋮ Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness ⋮ No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems ⋮ Arrow's possibility theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences

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