Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring

DOI10.1007/s00199-002-0322-7zbMath1058.91012OpenAlexW2043243507MaRDI QIDQ1408949

Massimiliano Amarante

Publication date: 28 September 2003

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0322-7

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic programmingIncomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games ⋮ Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Repeated games with almost-public monitoring

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