Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
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Publication:1409762
DOI10.1023/A:1025375803912zbMath1044.91019MaRDI QIDQ1409762
Publication date: 22 October 2003
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (15)
Framing the first-price auction ⋮ Revenue implications of strategic and external auction risk ⋮ Sequential auctions with capacity constraints: an experimental investigation ⋮ Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret ⋮ Separating probability weighting and risk aversion in first-price auctions ⋮ Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction ⋮ Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: an experimental study ⋮ Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities ⋮ Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback ⋮ Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions ⋮ Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions? ⋮ Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field ⋮ Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
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