Reinforcement and directional learning in the ultimatum game with responder competition

DOI10.1023/A:1025305020751zbMath1044.91006WikidataQ57949094 ScholiaQ57949094MaRDI QIDQ1409763

Brit Grosskopf

Publication date: 22 October 2003

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

competitionreinforcement learningultimatum gamedirectional learninglearning transfer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (9)

Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence ⋮ Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives ⋮ Simultaneous but independent ultimatum game: strategic elasticity or social motive dependency? ⋮ The limits to moral erosion in markets: social norms and the replacement excuse ⋮ Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence ⋮ Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game. ⋮ On the impulse in impulse learning ⋮ Stubborn learning ⋮ If you are offered the right of first refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design

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