Relative versus absolute speed of adjustment in strategic environments: Responder behavior in ultimatum games

DOI10.1023/A:1025309121659zbMath1135.91322OpenAlexW2125519528MaRDI QIDQ1409765

Nick Feltovich, Alvin E. Roth, Rami Zwick, David J. Cooper

Publication date: 22 October 2003

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1025309121659

zbMATH Keywords

learningbargainingGame Theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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