Pure strategy Markov equilibrium in stochastic games with a continuum of players.
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Publication:1410583
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00041-7zbMath1058.91011MaRDI QIDQ1410583
Publication date: 14 October 2003
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
Interval-valued cores and interval-valued dominance cores of cooperative games endowed with interval-valued payoffs ⋮ Discrete-time ergodic mean-field games with average reward on compact spaces ⋮ Total reward semi-Markov mean-field games with complementarity properties ⋮ Stationary anonymous sequential games with undiscounted rewards
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