Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.

DOI10.1016/S0895-7177(03)80003-1zbMath1044.91013OpenAlexW1968384148MaRDI QIDQ1410900

Hans-Hermann Bock, William H. E. Day, Fred R. McMorris

Publication date: 15 October 2003

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0895-7177(03)80003-1

zbMATH Keywords

manipulabilityvote concentrationcollective choicerulevoting scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Consensus rules for committee elections
• On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences
• Attainable results in committee elections.
• The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
• An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections
• Unnamed Item

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