A dual characterization of incentive efficiency.
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Publication:1411030
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00064-4zbMath1064.91052MaRDI QIDQ1411030
Publication date: 15 October 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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