Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1411031
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00073-5zbMath1077.91008MaRDI QIDQ1411031
Publication date: 15 October 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
CooperationReputationFinitely repeated prisoners' dilemmasRational learningRecurrent gamesSpeed of learning
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